In a recent study, Huberman and Regev (2001) analyze the puzzling case of a New York Times article (Kolatka, 1998) that caused a dramatic rise in the stock price of the small biotechnology company EntreMed, although the article did not contain any new information. The authors define incidents like this, which appear to be news events where in fact no new information is released, as "nonevents". They attribute the astounding market reaction to the fact that the article appeared in the upper left corner of the front page, accompanied by the label "A special report" and suggest that enthusiastic public attention may move stock prices in the absence of new information. This paper investigates whether media attention systematically impacts stock prices by analyzing CEO interviews on CNBC. On average, these CEO interviews should not contain new information for several reasons. First, those interviews are usually triggered by some preceding event. For example, 25% of the interviews in our sample appear on the day of a company's earnings announcement or on the following day and can be understood as CEOs' comment or clarification of news that are already presented. Second, CEO interviews have to be scheduled prior to broadcast and are announced on CNBC's website one day prior to the interview. It is likely that at least some market participants learn of the interview and even of the topics discussed ahead of time. Finally, CEOs have a vital interest in appearing optimistic and putting a positive spin on every question they face due to their career concerns and often substantial stock and option holdings in their own company demonstrates that ticker confusion leads to an unusual amount of co-movement between the stocks of these companies and argues that a large proportion of MCI transaction is due to approximately one percent of the trades that small investors intend to make in MCIC but erroneously enter as trades for MCI. He states: "If this trivial group of noise traders can persistently impact the price of MCI, one could only imagine what would occur if a group of correlated noise traders experienced a change in sentiment regarding a group of stocks" (Rashes, 2001 (Rashes, , p.1924 .
This study examines the price impact of a group of correlated noise traders who watch CNBC, the financial cable network that is prominently blamed for fueling the "Wall Street Hype Machine. 4 5 " CNBC claims that due to Internet and cable television the informational advantage of professional traders has disappeared, that its viewers get information as fast as the pros and urges its viewers to "profit from it. 6 " If CNBC viewers believe that they can make money by trading on news, then these viewers must react very quickly because in efficient markets information is quickly incorporated into stock prices. Busse and Green (in press) A mistake Friday on financial-news cable channel CNBC ran up shares of MACC Private Equities MACC almost 80%. The ticker of the private investment firm was mistakenly displayed in place of the ticker for chipmaker Applied Micro Circuits, AMCC which had received an analyst upgrade. Shares of MACC Private Equities closed 6% higher at 9 13/16, on more than 300% of its normal volume, or 336,000 shares. Shares at one point traded at 17 1/2, about 50% higher than its previous 52-week high. Applied Micro Circuits rose 2% to 98 3/4 (Anderson, 2000).
The initial assumptions of this study are that CEO interviews are on average nonevents exclusive to CNBC, and that a significant fraction of CNBC's audience believes in making money by trading on news. The market response to these interviews can therefore be viewed as a direct test the conjecture that enthusiastic public attention alone may move stock prices away from fundamentals, thereby shedding more light on the price impact of the financial news media [Merton (1987) ; Shiller (2000) ; Huberman and Regev (2001) ].
Specifically, this study considers four hypotheses. The null hypothesis assumes that financial markets do not react to CEO interviews because these interviews do not reveal new information. Merton's (1987) investor recognition hypothesis suggests that CEO interviews, even without revealing new information, may impact firms' investor base, thereby permanently affecting stock prices: "a newspaper or other mass media story about the firm or its industry that reaches a large number of investors who are not currently shareholders, could induce some of this number to incur the set-up costs and follow the firm. Having done so, in our model, these investors would evaluate the detailed substantive information about the firm, become new shareholders, and the value of the firm would rise. It should be stressed that the current shareholders may already know all the information contained in such stories" (Merton, 1987, p. 500). The price pressure hypothesis states that enthusiastic public attention creates temporary price pressure in response to the interview. Merton (1987, p. 503) notes that "media coverage, public relations and other investor marketing activities could play an important causal role in creating and sustaining speculative bubbles and fads among investors." Similar, Shiller (2000, p. 29) argues that "enhanced business reporting leads to increased demand for stocks, just as advertisements for a consumer product make people more familiar with the product, remind them of the option to buy, and ultimately motivate them to buy." Finally, the information hypothesis also predicts a permanent change in stock prices, but instead of attributing the price impact to an increase in investor base, it relaxes the notion of CEO interviews being nonevents on average and assumes that CEOs reveal new information 7 . Hence, this study investigates whether prices change at all (null hypothesis), and if they do change, whether the price changes are transitory (due to price pressure) or permanent (due to an increased shareholder base or because CEOs disclose new information) 8 .
My results can be summarized as follows. First, I find a significant abnormal return of 1.86 percent and higher trading volume over the two days prior to the interview. Market participants seem to react either to a confounding event that triggers the interview, or information about the CEO interview itself is incorporated within this time period. Second, I document a significant mean abnormal return of 1.65 percent and a 169 percent increase in mean abnormal turnover on the day of the interview. Third, prices exhibit strong mean reversion of negative 2.78 percent over the 10 trading days following the interview. Fourth, a simple measure of the "limelight effect" suggests that almost all of the price increase during the two days prior to the interview and on the day of the interview itself is in fact due to media attention. I discuss whether rational traders who expect an option-like payoff from a small subsample of CEO interviews or asymmetric information can explain these findings. However, the empirical evidence and the fact that I cannot find support for alternative explanations leads me to conclude that on average, the appearance of CEOs on CNBC creates transitory buying pressure by enthusiastic investors. This conclusion is in line with Huberman and Regev's (2001) conjecture that enthusiastic public attention can move stock prices away from the fundamentals. But in contrast to their case study, I find that the price impact of CEO interviews is only transitory and prices quickly mean revert. Because a strategy that tries to take advantage of this transitory price pressure involves on average short sells, it may take some time for market participants to verify that the observed stock increase is just due to media hype and not to new information. This may explain why we observe mean reversion from the day following the interview.
The findings are also are consistent with several studies reporting short-term overreaction in the initial price response to analyst recommendations that are subsequently followed by price reversals. Stickel (1985) documents positive abnormal returns for two days after the publication of the Value Line rankings followed by a reversal on day three. Barber and Loeffler (1993) and Liang (1999) report a similar pattern for stock picks in the Wall Street Journal's "Dartboard" column. Busse and Green (in press) use intra-daily data to examine the market reaction to analyst's stock recommendation on CNBC's Morning Call and Midday Call segments. They find that prices respond within seconds of the initial mention, with positive reports fully incorporated within one minute. This one-minute response (41 basis points during Midday Call and 6.8 basis points during Morning Call) is then followed by a small reversal during the next three minutes.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the CEO interview data and provides summary statistics. Section 3 examines the price dynamics and trading activity around CEO interviews and presents the main empirical findings. Section 4 investigates the robustness of the results by analyzing various subsamples, decomposing the price dynamics into effects due to information and media attention, and discussing alternative explanations of the findings. Section 5 summarizes and discusses some important implications of the results. Details about sample selection procedure and event study methodology are included in the Appendix.
I. Sample Description

A. Sample Selection
Since its creation on April 17, 1989, CNBC has become the world's most popular business television channel. 77 million households in the U.S. and Canada (160 million households worldwide) can watch it. Viewership during trading days approaches 500,000 households (Nielsen Media Research). CNBC's regular programming features several interviews with CEOs of publicly traded companies during the day. After extracting this interview data from CNBC's website and merging the interview sample with the stock database of the Center Subsequently, it decreased by over 50 percent. On the other hand, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) Index remained relatively stable over the sample period. As reported in Table III, 52 percent of the interviews deal with firms traded on NASDAQ while 46 percent of the interviews concern firms traded on the NYSE; this sample period therefore provides an interesting setting to examine the price impact of CEO appearances on CNBC 9 .
Although transcripts and videotapes are available for many of the interviews in the sample, a content analysis of these interviews would be a very challenging task. The language used in the interviews is very casual, which makes the categorization by keywords highly unreliable. Additionally, viewers might trade on nonverbal signals like the posture of the CEO interviewed. Finally, the character of many interviews is primarily evaluative and predictive, which would require a highly subjective scaling of those qualitative predictions. For all these reasons, I do not attempt to analyze the content of the interviews. However, 104 merger-related interviews and 898 earnings-related interviews are identified because they occur within one trading day to the merger or earnings announcement, respectively. Panel C shows the distribution of interviews across CNBC's daily broadcasting schedule.
B. Timing of CEO Interviews
Today's Business reports on overnight developments and major business stories abroad and previews key issues which could potentially move the market. Squawk Box is designed as a "pregame" jump on the business day with live reports from major investment banks and the floor of the New York Stock Exchange. It contains the segment "CEO Call" where host Mark Haines interviews CEOs prior to market opening. Market Watch reports economic and corporate news during the morning. Segments include "Global Market Watch", "Stocks to Watch", Morning Call", Winners & Losers" and "The Market Watcher". 33.5 percent of the CEO interviews take place during Power Lunch, which is hosted by Bill Griffeth and produced by Joel Franklin.
Market Wrap analyzes the day's business news, reports extended hours updates and includes instudio interviews. Business Center is CNBC's signature evening business newscast that reviews the day's top business and financial market headlines. CEO interviews take place as part of the segment "CEO Spotlight". The hosts and producers of these shows are likely to have quite an impact on the amount and quality of information that is disseminated during CEO interviews as well as the timing of the interviews.
While the timing of CEO interviews is in part determined by CNBC's broadcasting schedule, the distribution of these interviews seems to correspond also to the overall flow of public information. Mitchell and Mulherin (1994) and Berry and Howe (1994) find that the flow of financial news seems to be higher on Tuesdays, Wednesdays, and Thursdays, and the distribution of CEO appearances on CNBC across weekdays reflects this pattern 10 . Berry and Howe (1994) also report the average number of information observations by time of day. They find a significant increase of stories 90 minutes prior to market opening, even more stories during the morning trading hours and a decrease during lunchtime. Most of the daily news arrives during the first 90 minutes after the market has closed. Consistent with their findings, Figure 2 shows a large number of interviews just prior to market opening at 9:30 a.m. and during the 90 minutes following market closing. However, 34 percent of the CEO interviews air during lunchtime. CNBC might choose to interview most of the CEOs during lunchtime because CEOs may be more available, viewership is higher and less new information is arriving.
In summary, while the intra-daily distribution of interviews seems to be driven by CNBC's broadcasting schedule, the distribution of interviews across weekdays reflects the overall number of financial news stories as documented in earlier studies. Table II interviews by size and book-to-market ratio. Each observation is ranked into deciles by its market capitalization six trading days prior to the interview, and its recent book-to-market ratio, provided that the last fiscal year has been completed for at least 4 months 11 . In Table V 
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II. Price Dynamics and Trading Activity around CEO Interviews
A. Price Dynamics
In order to assess the impact of CEO interviews on security prices of sample firms, this study employs standard event study methodology. During the estimation period of an event study, the expected (normal) returns of the sample securities are estimated. These estimated returns are then compared to actual returns in the event period surrounding the firm's CEO appearance on CNBC.
Results are based on the market model, which relates the return of any given stock i to the return of the market portfolio. However, because every day CNBC broadcasts several interviews, and a given company's CEO can appear several times on CNBC, an event consists of a unique date-firm combination. Therefore, the index i does not just refer to a particular firm, but to a particular firm at a particular date where the firm's CEO appears on CNBC. The term 'event' is used in this sense.
Hence, for any stock at a given interview date i,
where R it and R mt are the period-t returns on stock at a given interview date and the market portfolio, respectively, and ε it is the stochastic error term for event i on day t. This methodology treats the stock return of sample firm i, R it , as conditional on the market's overall performance and controls for systematic risk via the estimate of β i for each security.
For each event i, prediction errors, PE it , are calculated for each day in the event period,
). (
The prediction errors are estimates of the abnormal returns to the stockholders of the sample firms for each of the 61 days centered around the day of the interview. Average prediction errors, APE t , across all observations (N) are calculated for each day in the event period. These averages are cumulated, CAPE k , to provide a series of cumulative average prediction errors in the event period,
A more detailed discussion of this event study methodology is provided in Appendix B.
Average prediction errors for intervals around the CEO interviews are presented in Table   IV . CEO interviews on CNBC tend to be preceded by positive prediction errors, especially during the two days prior to the interview day. After the interview prediction errors become negative. Using the CRSP value-weighted index as proxy for the market portfolio, the cumulative average abnormal return prior to CEO interviews is 1.86 for the window [-2, -1] and 1.65 percent for the event day [0] . In contrast, the cumulative average abnormal return for the window [+1, +10] is negative 2.78 percent. t-statistics are calculated using several different methods, which are also described in Appendix B. However, the results are robust to different adjustments.
B. Trading Activity
Price change, as Beaver (1968) points out, reflects the average change in traders' beliefs due to an announcement, whereas trading volume reflects the sum of the differences in traders'
reactions to this announcement. The stock price evidence described in the previous section Growth in volume around some CEO appearances could be the result of an increase in the number of shares outstanding. One way to disentangle the effect of growth in outstanding shares from higher volume due to differential belief revision is to compute share turnover, the ratio of daily volume to the number of shares outstanding (Miller, 1977) 13 .
Define average turnover
as the sum of share-weighted turnover during the estimation period (day -106 through day -6).
Daily excess turnover, DET ik , is defined as the difference between average turnover and daily turnover for every day k of the event period. Average daily excess turnover, ADET k equals the sum of daily excess turnover across observations:
(7) Figure 3 shows that the average (median) daily excess turnover around CEO interviews on CNBC increases from 16 (-11) percent two days prior to interviews to 56 (0) percent one day prior. Average (median) daily excess turnover increases by 169 (59) percent on the day of the CEO appearance and 65 (12) percent one day after the interview.
The increase in trading volume prior to the time when CNBC publishes its broadcasting schedule accompanies a positive abnormal return of 1.86% for the two days preceding the interview. This run-up could be due to the fact that many interviews are in fact a reaction to confounding events that precedes the interview, such as earnings announcements. In that case, increased trading volume and price run-up are not caused by the CEO interview. On the other hand, market participants may learn about upcoming CEO interviews before CNBC releases this information and trade on this news. Further analysis needs to be done to distinguish between these two possibilities.
. On aggregate, the appearance of CEOs on CNBC seems to capture the attention of CNBC's audience. The documented price dynamics are consistent with transitory buying pressure due to increased media attention.
III. Robustness
This section investigates whether the findings presented in the previous section are robust across subsamples and proposes a simple decomposition of the observed price dynamics into an information effect due to information release and a limelight effect due to media attention. It also discusses whether rational traders who expect an option-like payoff from the announcement of CEO appearances on CNBC could drive the documented price dynamics. Finally, the price dynamics surrounding CEO interviews are related to characteristics commonly associated with asymmetric information.
A. Significance and Robustness of the Results
Every event study has to make distributional assumptions about abnormal returns in order to test whether these returns are significantly different from zero. If these assumptions are not met in applied work, tests of significance may be misspecified and potentially reject the nullhypothesis of zero abnormal return too often. The test-statistic that appears least likely to be misspecified in the context of this study is due to Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen (1991) and corrects for serial correlations, event clustering, and event-induced heteroskedasticity. However, this study verifies that the choice of different tests of significance does not alter the reported findings. The specifics of the different tests employed are discussed in Appendix B, the results are documented in Table IV .
To further investigate whether a particular group of stocks drives these results, event studies are conducted for several subsamples. Summary results of these studies are reported in Table V and document that the described pattern of positive abnormal returns prior to the interview and negative abnormal returns afterwards prevails throughout all subsamples except NYSE firms in 2000. The magnitude of these price dynamics is larger for Nasdaq firms then for NYSE firms and also larger for small cap stocks then for large cap stocks. The pattern also prevails for CEO interviews that are confounded by an earnings-or M&A-announcement within one trading day of the interview. The results hold when using the value-weighted CRSP index or the equal-weighted CRSP index as proxies for the market. In conclusion, the documented price dynamics are robust to the choice of test-statistics and prevail throughout almost all subsamples.
B. Decomposition of Information Effect and Limelight Effect
This subsection further discusses the initial assumption of CEO interviews being nonevents on average. Suppose instead that CEOs on average reveal information. As soon as the market learns about an upcoming CEO interview, traders gather additional information and update their believes about potential news being announced in the near future. While individual CEOs may either exceed or do not meet market expectations once they actually appear on television, the market's expectations should be correct on average, because systematic over-or underreaction results in a profitable investment opportunity. According to the information hypothesis, prices should not exhibit drift on average after the new information has been incorporated into prices.
Under this premise, it is possible to decompose the price dynamics into an information effect due to information release and a limelight effect due to media attention. Results in Table   IV suggest that the market reaction during the two days prior to the CEO interview and on the interview date itself captures the total effect of both the price dynamics due to information release and due to media attention. The information effect measures the degree of permanence in the market reaction to CEO interviews. The limelight effect measures the degree to which price dynamics are transient and is calculated as follows:
( ) 
where 1 r is the abnormal return due to the total effect, 1 1 1 r r + is the return necessary to completely undo the total effect, and 2 r is the actual price dynamic following the interview. The negative sign accounts for the fact that the total effect and the actual price dynamic following the interview usually have opposite signs. A limelight measure of 1 signifies a nonevent because is suggests that the price dynamics are completely transitory and hence no information were revealed. In contrast, a limelight measure close to zero suggests a permanent price change due to the information content of an announcement. This approach is potentially biased against identifying all price dynamics due to media attention if the news media has in fact a permanent price impact, as documented by Huberman and Regev (2001) . Table V reports the limelight measure for the complete sample and various subsamples.
As a proxy for the total effect, 1 r , the cumulative abnormal return over the 2 days prior to the interview and on the interview date itself, CAR[-2,0] is used. The abnormal cumulative return during the following 10 trading days, CAR[+1,+10], proxies for 2 r , the price dynamics due to media attention. For the whole sample, the limelight measure suggests that 82 (98) percent of the initial price response is due to media attention, when the value-weighted (equally-weighted) CRSP index is used to proxy for the market portfolio. The limelight effect is stronger for large cap companies then for mid cap and small cap companies. The subsamples by weekday reveal that although both the abnormal return on the interview day and the number of CEO interviews are highest on Wednesdays, the limelight effect is actually weaker compared to the beginning and the end of the week. This finding suggests that the informativeness of CEO interviews increases slightly during the week, which may be due to the fact that the overall flow of information increases as well (Mitchell and Mulherin, 1994 and Berry and Howe, 1994) . While only NYSE stocks in 2000 do not exhibit a limelight effect, Nasdaq stocks in 2000 and large cap stocks actually have a limelight measure that is greater than one, signifying a reversal stronger than the initial increase.
Even under the restrictive assumption that the entire price impact of increased media attention disappears within 10 trading days following the CEO interviews, results based on the limelight measure suggests that, on average, CEO interviews come pretty close to being nonevents. However, a small fraction of the observed price dynamics may be due to information disclosure. The next subsection examines whether information content of interviews can help explaining the documented pattern.
D. Information Content of CEO Interviews
Assume that most CEO interviews are nonevents, but that a certain percentage of interviews contain information that permanently increases stock prices by a large magnitude. If traders cannot assess which interviews will cause a large price increases until they analyze the actual interview, it may be rational to buy the stock of every firm whose CEO is expected to appear on CNBC in order to capture the option-like payoff of a few high-magnitude price increases. The increased demand would drive up prices prior to the interview. Because most interviews do not contain information, most stocks would exhibit a price reversal as the option expires valueless.
To examine the validity of such reasoning, all interviews are sorted into bins based on whether they exhibit positive or negative abnormal returns prior to the event [-2,-1], on the event date [0], and over the following ten trading days [+1,+10]. Table VI reveals that for 461 interviews, abnormal returns are indeed positive over the entire period [-2,+10] . For these interviews, the average (median) abnormal return over the ten days following the interview is 8.07 (5.49) percent. However, Table VI also indicates that even after conditioning on pre-event and event abnormal returns, more interviews exhibit price reversals then price continuation and that the average and median magnitude of the negative abnormal return is larger than the average and median magnitude of the positive abnormal return. These results suggest that the observed price dynamics cannot be explained by rational traders anticipating an option-like payoff from a subsample of CEO interviews.
E. Asymmetric Information
If the price dynamics surrounding CEO interviews on CNBC are driven by information disclosure, one might expect that firms that choose CNBC as a venue for voluntary disclosure share some cross-sectional characteristics commonly associated with a larger degree of informational asymmetry between management and market participants. Overall, these preliminary results are in line with the notion that the price and turnover dynamics observed are due to an increase in attention rather than to CEOs appearing on television to reduce asymmetric information.
IV. Summary and Conclusion
While financial markets seem to underreact to corporate events, one can observe large stock price movements without any apparent news. Since Shiller's (1981) classic account of a mismatch between news and stock price movements, the apparent "excess volatility" in asset prices has been attributed to noise trading, suggesting that investors may overreact to unobserved stimuli. Although the financial news media has long been suspected of stimulating noise traders, accounts that document media hype by relating the financial news media to excess volatility, have been rare and mostly anecdotal.
To analyze the role of the media on the price formation of stock prices, this paper takes a closer look at how the market reacts to CEO appearances on CNBC, which are taken as nonevents that do not contain new information. Consistent with price pressure, this study documents a significant mean price increase of 1.65 percent and higher trading volume on the day of the interview. Prices exhibit strong mean reversion of negative 2.78 percent over the 10 trading days following the interview. These findings suggest that the increased attention due to CEO interviews creates transitory buying pressure by enthusiastic investors. These results support the conjecture that enthusiastic public attention may move stock prices away from fundamentals and are consistent with the popular notion of media hype. But in contrast to Huberman and Regev's (2001) case study, the price impact of CEO interviews is only transitory and prices quickly mean revert. Because a strategy that tries to take advantage of this transitory price pressure involves on average short sells, it may take some time for market participants to verify that the observed stock increase is just due to media hype and not to new information. This may explain why we observe mean reversion from the following day on.
A great part of CNBC's success is probably due to the fact that viewers consider it to be an important source for breaking news. CNBC claims that viewers get the latest financial news as they occur, that CNBC has leveled the playing field between individual and institutional investors by even-handedly providing real-time information to its viewers. However, the documented price dynamics around CEO interviews are consistent with the notion that, on average, these interviews do not contain any new information. In addition, the substantial price and volume dynamics prior to these interviews may indicate that even if CEOs would be willing to disclose new information live to the public, CNBC is actually unable to prevent information leakage prior to CEO appearances on television. Further analysis is required to reliably attribute the price dynamics prior to CEO interviews to either a confounding event or to information leakage, but investors may be cautioned by these findings when considering whether to trade on supposedly breaking news.
Recent behavioral asset pricing models assume that individuals underreact to public news and overreact to private information [i.e., Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998); Hong and Stein (1999) ]. In contrast, the findings in this paper suggest that investors overreact to CEO interviews on CNBC. It may be worthwhile examining whether the reported price dynamics are specific to CNBC's broadcast or whether other media outlets cause overreaction as well. If markets in fact underreact to corporate events and overreact to media-transmitted nonevents, one may find interesting implications for the behavioral models mentioned above.
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Appendix B: Event Study Methodology
This appendix discusses the event study methodology employed in this paper in more
detail. An examination of the impact of CEO Interviews on the price dynamics of sample firms requires a measure of abnormal return. The abnormal return, 
By removing the portion of the return it R that is related to variation in the market's return, 
Because we have chosen the estimation window to be large (255 trading days), we assume that the contribution of the second component to ) ( 
Hypothesis Testing
Under the assumption described above,
can be used to test the null hypothesis that the abnormal returns are zero. Because 
The portfolio test statistic for day τ in event time is
T-statistics in Table IV with the column header Standard-t are calculated based on (A15).
Assuming time-series independence, the test statistic for )
If clustering is present, this portfolio approach will impound any residual cross-sectional correlation in its estimate of portfolio residual's standard deviation.
However, besides being cross-sectionally correlated, the abnormal return estimators often have different variances across firms. A common way of addressing this problem is the standardized residual method (Patell, 1976) . Define the standardized abnormal return, 
The results of using (A21) are reported in Table IV Musumeci, and Poulsen (1991) use simulations to document the empirical properties of (A21).
They find that (A21) has more power than (A20) and is essentially unaffected by the presence of event-date clustering. Merton's (1987) investor recognition hypothesis also predicts a permanent shift in security prices. But in contrast to the information hypothesis, his "model is consistent with the observation that stock price sometimes reacts to a broad and widely-circulated report about the firm, even when all the substantive information in the report has been previously announced" (Merton, 1987, p. 501) . Only one percent of the interviews concern stocks traded on the American Stock Exchange (AMEX). This may be due to the fact that AMEX stocks account for 10 percent of all stocks, but for less than one percent of total market capitalization. Mondays. Due to the time lag of the print medium, however, they do not report fewer news items on Fridays.
11
Monthly size and annual book-to-market breakpoints are based on the New York Stock
Exchange and where downloaded from Ken French's website.
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For example, Jain (1988) reports that the announcements of certain macroeconomic variables such as money supply and consumer price index induce significant abnormal returns but no abnormal volume.
13
Turnover can be computed either on a dollar-weighted basis, by dividing the dollar value of trading by the market capitalization of outstanding shares, or on a share-weighted basis, by dividing the number of shares traded by the number of shares outstanding. This paper uses share-weighted turnover.
14 Sales is COMPUSTAT data item 6, research expenditure is data item 46, advertising is data item 45, book value of equity is data item 60, and the FORBES ranking is data item 279. For every interview, the most recent accounting data available are used, provided that at least four months have passed between companies' fiscal yearend and the interview in question. This ensures that the accounting information is available to investors by the time of the interview. 
Figure 2 Frequency Distribution of CEO Interviews on CNBC by Time of the Day
This figure plots the number of interviews broadcast on CNBC by time of the day for 3039 interviews where time stamps are available. Time is measured in five minutes intervals as CNBC reports its time stamps for CEO interviews in five minutes increments. Percentage average and median prediction errors are calculated from the market model using both the CRSP equally weighted market index (columns 2 to 7) and the CRSP value weighted market index (columns 8-13). Columns 14 to 17 report average and median unadjusted raw returns. The alphas and betas for the market model are estimated during a 100-day estimation period from day -300 to day -46. Standard t-Statistics are based on the 'crude dependence adjustment' methodology of Brown and Warner (1985) . Standard Z-Statistics are calculated by using the standardized residual method (Patell, 1976) . Adjusted t-Statistics are calculated using the cross-sectional standard deviation method (Brown and Warner, 1985) . Adjusted Z-Statistics are based on the standardized cross-sectional test of Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen (1991) . $ Significant at the 10% level, * Significant at the 5% level, ** Significant at the 1% level, *** Significant at the 0.1% level. (PCAPE) in the three windows are calculated from the market model using both the CRSP equally weighted market index (columns 2 to 4) and the CRSP value weighted market index (columns 5-7). Columns 8 to 10 report cumulative average unadjusted raw returns. The alphas and betas for the market model are estimated during a 255-day estimation period from day -300 to day -46. Test-statistics are corrected for serial correlations, event clustering and event-induced heteroskedasticity according to Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen (1991) . $ Significant at the 10% level, * Significant at the 5% level, ** Significant at the 1% level, *** Significant at the 0.1% level.
Market Model, EW Index
Market This table presents results from cross-sectional regressions of (cumulative) abnormal returns on variables commonly assumed to be associated with the degree of asymmetric information between companies and investors. Columns 2 and 3 show results from a regression on the cumulative abnormal returns during the two days preceding the interview. Columns 4 and 5 show results from a regression on the abnormal return of the interview date. Columns 6 and 7 show results from a regression on the cumulative abnormal returns during the two days following the interview. LN_AGE is the natural logarithm of 1 plus the number of years the firm is listed on the CRSP files. LN_SIZE is the natural logarithm of the market capitalization 6 trading days prior to the interview. TURNOVER is the average turnover over 100 trading days 6 trading days prior to the interview. RESEARCH and ADVERTISING are research and advertising expenditures scaled by sales, respectively. BTM is the book-to-market ratio. FORBES is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is part of the Forbes 500 list. EARNINGS and MERGER are dummy variables equal to one if the interview is earnings-or merger&acquisition-related, respectively. NASDAQ is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm is trading on Nasdaq. NEGBTM is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm has negative book value. ADR is a dummy variable equal to one if a foreign firm's American Depository Receipts or American Depository Shares are traded on an American exchange. The regression controls for the six industry groups that had the largest number of interviews during the sample period. Because the White-Heteroskedasticity Test rejects the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity, t-statistics are computed with heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors.
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